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Codifying Innocence: A Modest
Step Toward Reform
J. Philip Calabrese†
The twenty-fifth anniversary of the enactment of the Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 19961 provides an opportunity for
a few observations. These reflections come not from systematic study,
but from the perspective of a judge who, as one small part of his
practice, formerly represented a number of clients in federal district and
appellate courts petitioning for writs of habeas corpus. Under the
statute, relief is rare. From the perspective of attorneys general and
those who defend against claims, few have merit. Therefore, the statute
appropriately limits relief, even if cases take too long to reach their
inevitable result, often on procedural grounds that foreclose collateral
review of the merits.
On the other side, those who represent petitioners and study
practice and procedure under the statute in the legal academy largely
view the AEDPA as a lost cause. In their view, the statute fetishizes
procedure at the expense of fundamental constitutional rights and too
narrowly circumscribes relief. Additionally, the intricacies the statute
layers on the writ—in a federal system in which Article III presumes,
as a matter of constitutional law, that State courts can and will
vindicate federal rights2—impose significant access-to-justice burdens
on overwhelmingly pro se petitioners. Those in this camp see the
AEDPA as sitting on the precipice of collapsing under its own weight
as a result of the cumulative effect of these developments over the last
two and a half decades. But however much they favor repeal of the
AEDPA, such a legislative step appears highly unlikely.
In the AEDPA, Congress asserted its prerogative to shape the writ,
then abandoned the field. Since then, the federal courts, and the
Supreme Court in particular, drive common-law making under the
statute. This ad hoc interpretation of the statute has contributed
greatly to the complexities attending habeas practice, particularly
involving issues of procedural default or claims of ineffective assistance
of counsel, as most petitions invariably seem to do. At a high level,
these judicial developments promote the overall congressional goals
embodied in the AEDPA. Though Congress could make federal litigation over the writ more “effective,” and better promote the goals of
comity and finality, with legislation cutting through at least some of
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1.

Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214.

2.

See generally Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 275
(1997); Printz v. U.S., 521 U.S. 898, 907 (1997).
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the procedural thicket that has grown up around its statutory creation,
it shows no interest in doing so.
As the federal courts have lived with the AEDPA, another phenomenon has grown up alongside it over the last quarter century or so,
primarily but not exclusively in state courts. A growing number of
exonerations has laid bare the need for effective post-conviction and
collateral proceedings, at least in a limited number of cases. These
exonerations initially resulted from advances in DNA technology3 and
later from other flaws and deficiencies in the criminal justice system,
such as junk science involving bite marks and arson investigation, witness identification, and false or coerced confessions.4 At some level, the
writ seeks to vindicate claims of innocence—at least so long as a Statecourt conviction results from a substantive constitutional violation.
Less clear is whether the Constitution provides a remedy under the
AEDPA’s standard in § 2254(d) for an actually innocent defendant
whose conviction is not obtained in violation of his constitutional
rights.5
Against that background, this essay proposes a modest amendment
to the AEDPA as a reform that might have value beyond its fairly
limited formal reach. Explaining the proposal requires a little additional
context. In Schlup v. Delo,6 a white prisoner was convicted of stabbing
a black inmate to death based on the testimony of two corrections
officers.7 “[N]o physical evidence connect[ed]” the defendant to the
crime, for which he received a death sentence.8 Schlup developed new
evidence that he contended established his actual innocence—namely,
transcripts of inmate interviews conducted five days after the murder
that bolstered his defense that he was in the cafeteria when the murder
occurred and could not have committed it.9 He also produced affidavits
from two black inmates who witnessed the murder and swore Schlup
did not commit it.10

3.

See generally Paul C. Gianelli, Criminal Discovery, Scientific Evidence,
and DNA, 44 Vand. L. Rev. 791 (1991).

4.

See generally Paul C. Gianelli, Junk Science and the Execution of an
Innocent Man, 7 N.Y.U. J.L. & Liberty 221, 223 n.11 (2013).

5.

For example, see Herrera v. Collins, where five justices agreed that a meritorious claim of actual innocence does not require an independent constitutional violation. 506 U.S. 390, 419–20 (1993) (O’Connor, J., concurring,
Kennedy, J., joining); id. at 430–31 (Blackmun, dissenting, J., Stevens,
J., and Souter, J., joining).

6.

513 U.S. 298 (1995).

7.

Id. at 302, 305.

8.

Id. at 302.

9.

Id. at 308–09.

10.

Id. at 308.
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With this evidence, Schlup filed a second petition for a writ of
habeas corpus (Congress had not yet enacted the AEDPA, which limits
second or successive petitions11), alleging violations of Brady v. Maryland,12 and ineffective assistance of counsel.13 Because the petitioner did
not present those claims in his first petition, he was unable to make a
showing of cause or prejudice to excuse the procedural bar to review.14
Under Supreme Court jurisprudence at the time, a narrow exception
allowed a petitioner to avoid a procedural bar where he falls within a
limited “class of cases . . . implicating a fundamental miscarriage of
justice.”15 In this regard, a claim of actual innocence is procedural and
does not entitle a petitioner to relief—just to review under other
standards, in this case the standards for alleged Brady violations and
ineffective assistance of counsel.16
The Court held that “a petitioner who has been sentenced to death
[and] raises a claim of actual innocence to avoid a procedural bar to the
consideration of the merits of his constitutional claims” must establish
“that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have
convicted him in light of the new evidence.”17 This standard requires a
stronger showing than prejudice but less than proof by clear and
convincing evidence of acquittal.18 In Schlup, then, the Supreme Court
created an exception to a procedural bar that otherwise precludes
collateral review on the merits where a petitioner establishes a colorable
claim of actual innocence.19 Put another way, where a petitioner can
show that no reasonable juror would have convicted in light of new
evidence, Schlup provides a gateway to review the merits of constitutional claims.
On remand, the proceedings in the district court demonstrate the
operation of the Schlup gateway in practice. After analyzing the new
evidence Schlup presented, the district court found it credible.20 Then,
applying the standard the Supreme Court articulated, the district court
11.

See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2) (“A claim presented in a second or successive
habeas corpus application under section 2254 that was not presented in a
prior application shall be dismissed unless . . . .”).

12.

373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (holding that “suppression by the prosecution of
evidence favorable to an accused . . . violates due process”).

13.

Schlup, 513 U.S. at 307, 314.

14.

Id. at 314.

15.

Id. at 314–15 (quoting McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 494 (1991)).

16.

See id. at 314 (first citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984);
and then citing Brady, 373 U.S. 83).

17.

Id. at 326–27.

18.

Id. at 327.

19.

Id.

20.

Schlup v. Delo, 912 F. Supp. 448, 450–55 (E.D. Mo 1995).
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determined that no reasonable juror would have voted to convict in
light of the new evidence.21 Following an evidentiary hearing, the
district court granted a writ on the basis of ineffective assistance of
counsel.22 A constitutional violation, not likely innocence, provided the
ground for relief.
At a certain level, one might fairly view that result as inevitable.
After all, the Supreme Court reviewed the case and signaled that Schlup
had made a colorable showing of actual innocence.23 In such circumstances, it would be anomalous for an inferior court to analyze the
evidence and reach a contrary conclusion. Even so, the issuance of a
writ does not end the case. Following the issuance of the writ, in the
midst of his 1999 retrial, Schlup pled guilty to second-degree murder to
avoid the death penalty.24
But nothing mandates that a district court set aside a procedural
bar based on a showing of actual innocence and then determine that
the record supports a conclusion that a petitioner’s conviction resulted
from a violation of his constitutional rights. In such a circumstance,
there is no right to appeal under the AEDPA.25 That is, although a
court determines that a petitioner made a sufficient showing of actual
innocence, denial of his claims on the merits under § 2254(d) is not
reviewable unless a court first grants a certificate of appealability.26
Under the standard for issuance of a certificate of appealability in
§ 2253(c)(2), the prior showing of actual innocence does not factor into
the analysis. Only “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right” matters.27
As a practical matter, following a showing of actual innocence, a
court might not deny a certificate of appealability. But it happens. In
Cleveland v. Bradshaw,28 the petitioner made a showing that he was
innocent of the murder for which he was serving a sentence of life in
prison.29 Based on that showing, the Sixth Circuit set aside the
AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations, codified at 28 U.S.C.

21.

Id. at 455.

22.

Schlup v. Bowersox, No. 4:92CV443, 1996 WL 1570463, at *46 (E.D. Mo.
May 2, 1996).

23.

See Schlup, 513 U.S. at 325.

24.

Partial Innocence—Sentence Reduced, Death Penalty Info. Ctr.,
http://deathpenaltyinfo.org/policy-issues/innocence/partial-innocence
[https://perma.cc/YV2L-NSJW] (last visited Feb. 5, 2022).

25.

See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c).

26.

Id.

27.

Id. § 2253(c)(2).

28.

693 F.3d 626 (6th Cir. 2012).

29.

Id. at 642.
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§ 2244(d)(1).30 Following an evidentiary hearing on remand (at which,
in the interest of full disclosure, I served as co-counsel for the petitioner), the district court determined that the evidence did not support
the claim of actual innocence.31 Fair enough.
But whether one agrees or disagrees with that determination, surely
a colorable claim of actual innocence merits review. Yet the district
court summarily denied a certificate of appealability. In its entirety, the
district court stated: “because this Court finds Cleveland has not made
‘a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right,’ it declines
to issue a certificate of appealability.”32 Even though the Sixth Circuit
previously held that the petitioner had made a showing of actual innocence, it too denied a certificate of appealability. First, the court did so
in an unsigned order.33 On petition for panel rehearing and rehearing en
banc, the panel adhered to its decision,34 then the court denied rehearing
en banc.35 On application to the Circuit Justice, Justice Kagan also
denied a certificate of appealability.36
This experience confirms that the federal courts will not necessarily
use the writ to vindicate the innocent and may even seek to avoid
review, even where a petitioner makes a sufficient showing of actual
innocence. Therefore, to ensure review, an amendment to the statute is
necessary, adding language to § 2253(c) to the effect of what is italicized
below:
(1) Unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of
appealability, an appeal may not be taken to the court of appeals
from—
(A) the final order in a habeas corpus proceeding in which
the detention complained of arises out of process issued by
a State court; or
(B) the final order in a proceeding under section 2255.
(2) A certificate of appealability may issue under paragraph (1)
only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial
of a constitutional right. A person in custody need not obtain a
30.

Id.; 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) (“A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to
an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant
to the judgment of a State court.”).

31.

Cleveland v. Bradshaw, 65 F. Supp. 3d 499, 541–42 (N.D. Ohio 2014).

32.

Id. at 542 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2)).

33.

Cleveland v. Bradshaw, No. 15-3029, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 23573, at *12
(6th Cir. Feb. 24, 2016).

34.

Cleveland v. Bradshaw, No. 15-3029 (6th Cir. May 23, 2016).

35.

Cleveland v. Bradshaw, No. 15-3029 (6th Cir. June 7, 2016).

36.

Cleveland v. Bradshaw, No. 16A226 (U.S. Sept. 13, 2016) (Kagan, J.).
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certificate of appealability under paragraph (1) if that person
made a previous showing of actual innocence recognized by a
court of competent jurisdiction.
(3) The certificate of appealability under paragraph (1) shall
indicate which specific issue or issues satisfy the showing required
by paragraph (2).

Put simply, if a petitioner makes a showing of actual innocence
under Schlup, he is (and should be) entitled to an appeal as of right
from any adverse determination.
If anything, this proposed amendment is too modest. Few cases
pass through the Schlup gateway. For that reason, this proposed
amendment will hardly overburden the circuit courts. But appellate
review can serve as an important check in those few cases to ensure
that an innocent petitioner is not denied relief. Formally bringing
innocence into the Judicial Code and incorporating it into the statute
will also carry considerable symbolic weight. Moreover, restoring
Congress to its proper legislative role, through even a modest or limited
amendment such as this, might encourage other legislative interventions governing the Great Writ that are overdue.
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